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The research paper is a study on the application of FSA methodology to inland self-
unload carriers in the Pearl River Delta (PRD).   
 
Both quantity and tonnage of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD have increased in 
the last decade.  It is significant to analyze the risk of inland self-unload carrier since 
it has become a typical ship type in the PRD.  FSA has been proved to be a structured, 
systematic and useful methodology in evaluating and reducing risks in marine industry.  
The risk of research object is analyzed under the framework of FSA.    
 
Hazards of inland self-unload carriers are identified, ranked and analyzed via data 
analysis, risk matrix, event tree analysis (ETA) and fault tree analysis (FTA).  After 
verifying risks’ being in As Low As Reasonable Practical (ALARP) area, several risk 
control options (RCOs) are put forward.  Cost-effectiveness analysis (ECA) of one 
of the RCOs is conducted and NCAF of the RCO is calculated.  Suggestions are given 
based on the Acceptable NCAF (NCAFA).  Direction of further research is 
recommended.   
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1.1 Research Background 
The fast development of real estate industry in China generates heavy demand of river 
sand.  The demand is even bigger in the PRD since it is one of the three biggest 
economical circles in China.  Inland self-unload carriers are designed to transport 
sand, broken stones and other bulk building materials.  There are more and more 
inland self-unload carriers operated in the PRD for their high efficiency of unloading 
without reliance on unloading device from port terminals.  It is a relatively new type 
of bulk carrier, so the regulation is not as mature as other normal cargo ships in the 
PRD, resulting in higher frequency of accidents.  According to statistics, there are 408 
accidents which happened in the PRD from 2006 to 2015.  Accidents involving inland 
self-unload carriers account for about one fourth of all accidents while the rate of 
inland self-unload carriers to all ships operated in the PRD is far less than one fourth 
from the perspective of both quantity and tonnage.  In certain scenarios like ships’ 
colliding small boats, the risk of inland self-unload carriers is even higher than other 
ships.  Surveyors, FSC (Flag State Control) officers, investigators gave many 
suggestions on how to improve safety level, but none of them did systematic and 
structed analysis to the overall risk. 
FSA is a systematic and structured methodology adopted by International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in evaluating regulations on maritime safety and marine 
environmental protection via risk analysis and cost-benefit assessment (IMO, 2013).  
In recent decades, there are so many successful applications of FSA in marine industry 
and other industries, proving the availability of FSA in evaluating risk and making 
regulations.  The application of FSA to inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is 




1.2 Literature Review 
Relevant literatures were widely reviewed beforehand.  Pu illustrated the widely 
existed overload and free liquid surface after loading, leading to decreased stability 
(Pu & Xia, 2002).   Accumulated water in the cargo hold area is unavoidable because 
of the loading method of self-unload carriers.  The process of loading is not operated 
in a wharf but in the waterway.  Sand dredges transfer wetted sand to self-unload 
carriers directly.  The content of water varies from 10% to 20% and water needs time 
to exude from sand.  Even seafarers pump out water in and after the process of loading, 
still there will be some accumulated water exuding from wetted sand.  Pu 
recommended a method to calculate the effect of free liquid surface on stability.    
Though the risk control measure on free liquid surface has been adopted in 2004, 
hazards due to the loading method are not just free liquid surface.   Some seafarers 
are accustomed to sailing before water is pumped out completely enough, resulting in 
overloaded voyage, which is far more risky than free liquid surface according to the 
casualty statistics.  Still the method of supervising overload is selective check which 
is inefficient.  This paper brings forward a more intelligent option to supervise 
overload of inland self-unload carriers in the following text.  
Chen figured out the poor quality of inland seafarers and the loose management of 
inland shipping company in the PRD, coming up with some administrative suggestions 
(Chen & Wang, 2008).  Unlike ocean-going seafarers, the highest diploma of most of 
Chinese inland seafarers including captains and chief engineers is lower than senior 
middle school.  In China, individualized ship operation without establishing a 
company is illegal.  However, there are so many individual shipowners owning only 
one ship which the shipowner also works on.  It is uneconomical for each of them to 




shipping companies just have notional ownership of these ships for the convenience 
of individual shipowners’ joining companies, without actual control of ships.   
Hu pointed out the poor radar operational skill of inland seafarers in China and advised 
the administration to enhance training of how to use radar (Hu, 2008).  English 
instruction of imported radar is an obstacle for inland seafarers’ understanding of some 
functions.  Cao recommended the introduction of ARPA to inland ships (Cao, 2001). 
Wang recommended a telescopic conveyor belt to reduce the extension of conveyor 
belt, improving maneuverability and visual range, (Wang & Zheng & Chen, 2013).  
Inland self-unload carriers have a conveyor belt extended out of the bow for unloading 
of cargo.  The extension increases the maximum length of the carrier, weakening 
maneuverability like turning and visual range.  Telescopic conveyor which has been 
widely used on new inland self-unload carriers after 2015, can take the conveyor belt 
back to a certain extent after unloading. 
Kuang identified three common hazards which influence stability of inland self-unload 
carrier: free liquid surface, overload and improper loading (Kuang & Huang & Xie, 
2010).  Improper loading including unbalanced loading and over-high loading, 
decreases both stability and visual range.  Many inland seafarers do not pay enough 
attention to the harm of improper loading.  Unbalanced loading contributes to initial 
heel or excessive trim.  Over-high loading raises the gravity center of cargo, leading 
to poor stability as well as excessive blind area. 
Li advised designers to consider changing the shape of transverse section from V-shape 
to W-shape, lowering the gravity center of cargo, increasing the capacity of cargo hold 
(Li, 2011).  Li made both qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis on the 
advantages of W-shape cargo hold.   
Zhou demonstrated the sensitivity of stability to the amount of overload through a case 
study (Zhou, 2011).  The stability of the chosen self-unload carrier decreased sharply 




However, all these researchers just focused on certain problems of inland self-unload 
carriers rather than the overall risk.  So there is a gap in researching the overall risk 
of inland self-unload carriers and the cost-effectiveness of risk control measures.  A 
comprehensive analysis on the risk of inland self-unload carriers under the framework 
of FSA is meaningful in filling the gap. 
1.3 Scope 
This study limits to inland self-unload carriers of and above 300 GT in the PRD. 
Nearly 90% researches including all studies in literature review are about inland self-
unload carriers in the PRD since inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is more 
common than other areas.  Besides, it is more easy for the author to collect data since 
the author works in Guangdong MSA governing the PRD.   
Most of inland self-unload carriers below 300 GT in the PRD are very old ships about 
to be scrapped.  Considering that such small inland self-unload carriers have gradually 
lost their market under the tendency of large dimension, considering that most of them 
stopped operation in the last ten years, inland self-unload carriers below 300 GT are 
excluded from the research scope. 
1.4 Data sources 
The lack of national database of marine industry increases the difficulty of applying 
FSA to domestic ships in China.  Data about historical casualties is arranged from 
accidents reports one by one by the author.  Though the author collects and arranges 
investigation reports as complete as possible in these three months, still there may be 
omission for lack of database in China.  Cost-effectiveness of a RCO tends to be 
conservative in this study since adding omitted accidents into the calculation just 





This study assumes that risk acquired from historical accidents data is equal to the risk 
at the present stage.  The modification of historical data is omitted in this study.  All 
hazards occurred in the past are assumed to be the whole risk of research object. 
Number of inland self-unload carriers registered in Guangdong Province is easier to 
get than all inland self-unload carriers operated in the PRD.  Actually, nearly all 
inland self-unload carriers of and above 1000 GT registered in Guangdong Province 
are operated in the PRD.  As to inland self-unload carriers from 300 to 1000 GT, some 
of them may be operated in the east of Guangdong.  Anyway, this study assumes that 
all of them sail in the PRD to get a higher NCAF in CEA.  Correspondingly, the author 
excludes accidents of self-unload carriers registered outside Guangdong Province in 
statistics. 
1.6 Announcement 
The author identified one hazard – self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats and put 
forwarded one RCO for inland self-unload carriers of and above 1000 gross tonnage 
(GT) in an unpublished assignment (Author, 2018).  RCO 1 in this paper is just the 
same idea except that this research paper makes the scenario affected by the RCO more 
reasonable.  The threshold of small boats is 30 GT in this study while it is 120 GT in 
the assignment.  Two accidents involving multiple accidents are excluded because of 
the modification of the scenario.  Besides, several newly collected accidents are added 
into analysis.   
The cost of the RCO is higher in this study for using a more expensive product with 
larger visual range in CEA.  The average risk reduction estimated by experts is less 
than the value assumed in the assignment.  So NCAF of the RCO is higher than the 




The value of acceptable NCAF in this study is also more reasonable after 
comprehensive consideration of vacation, education and retirement in China. 
1.7 Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the research 
background, scope, assumptions and significance of this research.  Chapter 2 presents 
the development, framework and techniques of FSA and choice of techniques in this 
research paper.  Chapter 3 discloses information about the network of waterway in the 
PRD, characteristics of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD, recently introduced risk 
control measures and the calculation of acceptable NCAF in China.  Chapter 4 is  
data analysis of historical accidents.  Chapter 5 applies FSA to research object.  




2. METHODOLOGY OF FSA 
This chapter demonstrates the development, framework and techniques of FSA.  Five 
steps of FSA are presented.  Brief principles on choosing models are illustrated.  
2.1 Development of FSA 
Methodology similar to FSA has been applied in the industry of off-shore platform for 
a longer time.  As long ago as 1970s, UK and Norway started to develop Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (QRA) for off-shore industry in the North Sea (Brandsæter, 2002).  
In 1988, 167 fatalities died in the casualty of Piper Alpha and then experts introduced 
various models for risk analysis from other industries, summarizing a regulation about 
safety assessment which is very similar to FSA methodology.  In 1993, IMO accepted 
the concept of FSA in a proposal submitted by UK.  In 1997, IMO enacted Interim 
Guidelines for the application of Formal Safety Assessment.  In 2001, IMO passed 
the formal guidelines, providing a systematic method for decision-making.  The latest 
Guidelines for FSA was enacted in 2013 (IMO, 2013). 
Member states and classification societies from IACS submitted many standard reports 
about applications of FSA to IMO in recent years, providing guidance for IMO’s 
making rules, proving the effectiveness of FSA in marine industry.  There were so 
many successful applications of FSA that China Classification Society (CCS), the only 
recognized organization of the administration in China, started to pay more attention 
to the usage of FSA in making and modifying rules of ocean-going ships as well as 
domestic ships including inland self-unload carriers.  In 2015, CCS published 
Guidelines of Applications of FSA to Ships, which was an interpretation to the latest 





2.2 Framework of FSA 
Figure 2.1 shows the framework of FSA.  For a complete application of formal safety 
assessment, there are five steps: Step 1 - Identifying as many hazards with related 
accident scenarios as possible and ranking them according to frequency and severity;  
Step 2 - Analyzing factors and event sequences of casualties as well as assessing the 
level of risk;  Step 3 - Proposing RCOs to reduce risks;  Step 4 - Calculating cost, 
benefit, GCAF, NCAF and other values of RCOs;  Step 5 – Giving recommendations 
for decision-making. 
 



















2.3 Techniques Used in FSA 
For hazard identification and risk analysis, IMO recommends 9 techniques in the latest 
guidelines in 2013: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), What 
If Analysis Technique (WIAT), Risk Contribution Tree (RCT), Influence Diagram and 
Bayesian Network (IMO, 2013).  Besides, there are various models widely used in 
hazard identification and risk analysis as long as they are effective.  Statistical method 
is also a good tool for hazard identification and analysis. 
Risk matrix model is critical in determining the priorities of hazards in Step 1.  
Finding the most risky hazards is important since it is unnecessary to analyze all 
hazards.  All identified hazards are ranked based on their frequency and severity, and 
then researchers choose several main hazards with high risk to analyze in detail.   
It is obvious that there is no absolute safety.  All industries cannot mitigate all risks. 
So IMO recommended acceptable criteria on both individual risk and social risk in the 
latest guidelines.  Social risk typically expressed as FN-diagrams or Potential Loss of 
Life (PLL), is more important than individual risk.  Intolerable risk shall be reduced 
regardless of cost while negligible risk can be ignored.  Most risk are located in the 
ALARP area where a RCO shall not be implemented unless the RCO is cost-effective. 
Also, Delphi method, Heinrich method, NSC-Simonds method, Symonds method, 
Ratio coefficient method are widely used.  This research paper chooses Delphi 
method for determining the risk reduction and ratio coefficient method in calculating 
indirect property loss. 
There are many recommended options, but it is unnecessary to use all of them in one 
report.  Table 2.1 shows the applicability of methods for hazard identification, risk 
assessment and risk analysis (CCS, 2015).  CCS just listed techniques used in Step 1 









Risk Analysis Risk 
Assessment Consequence Possibility Risk Ranking 
Brain Storm A B B B B 
Delphi A B B B B 
Checklist A N N N N 
PHA A N N N N 
FEMA A N N N N 
HAZOP A A N N A 
What If A A A A A 
Risk Matrix A A A A B 
HRA A A A A B 
FTA N B B B B 
ETA N A A B N 
FN-diagram B A A B A 
Bayesian N N N N A 
Note: A – very applicable; B – applicable; N – not applicable. 
Sources: China Classification Society, (2015). Guidelines for the Application of Formal Safety 
Assessment in Ships. Peking: Author. 
2.4 Techniques Chosen in this Research 
Table 2.2 presents the techniques chosen in this research.  Organizing a meeting of 
experts is inoperable for a student studying in university.  Delphi is easier to operate 
since the author can consult the experts one by one by email or other electronic means.  
Most of experts consulted are investigators and surveyors from Guangdong MSA and 
3 experienced navigators on the inland self-unload carriers in the PRD.  Besides, their 
opinions are essential in identifying hazards and deciding risk reduction of RCOs.   
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is much easier to operate for a student.  PHA is 
suitable for brief analysis.  Though the paper identifies as many hazards as possible, 
only several main hazards with high risk are further analyzed.  Nearly all experts in 
Guangdong MSA advise me to focus on the top-ranked hazards rather than 
comprehensiveness of hazard identification.  So PHA is enough for hazard 




Table 2.2 – Techniques used in this paper 
Step 1 - Hazards Identification Step 2 - Risk Analysis Step 4 - CEA 
Identification Ranking Analysis Assessment Risk Reduction 
Historical data Historical data FTA 
FN-Diagram Delphi 
PHA  Risk Matrix ETA 





3. BACKGROUND CONCERNING RESEARCH OBJECT  
3.1 Waterway in the PRD 
The PRD, mainly converged by the West River, the North River and the East River, is 
located in the middle south of Guangdong Province.  So many rivers crisscross, 
forming a network of waterway with more than 6000 kilometers of inland navigation 
mileage, producing one of the three biggest economical circles in China.  Throughput 
of ports in the PRD accounts for 80% of the whole throughput in Guangdong Province 
in the last decade, making one of the three busiest networks of waterway (Wang, 2013).  
As shown in Figure 3.1, the PRD is mainly made up by nine cities: Guangzhou, 
Zhaoqing, Foshan, Dongguan, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Zhuhai and Shenzhen.  
Shenzhen is excluded from the research since it is a typical seaport with little inland 
navigation mileage. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Network of waterway in the PRD 




Besides massive merchant ships, there are more than 10,000 small fishing boats in the 
PRD.  Figure 3.2 is a typical fishing boat in the Pearl River.  Normally, these ships 
are around 10 meters and less than 30 GT.  Fishmen on the boats are local villagers 
with little safety awareness.   
 
Figure 3.2 – A typical fishing boat in the Pearl River 
Sources: Author 
With the development of economy, considerable bridges have been built in recent years 
in the PRD.  There is a bridge on the main waterway every 6 kilometers averagely in 
the PRD.  Insufficient clearance of some bridges on the main waterway restricts the 
development inland navigation, raising the risk of bridges’ being collided by ships with 
high maximum height like self-unload carriers. 
3.2 Characteristics of Inland Self-unload Carriers in the PRD 
Figure 3.3 is a picture of a typical inland self-unload carrier operated in the PRD.  
Normally, self-unload carriers have bigger sheer at stem, resulting in greater blind area 
than general bulk carriers.  Besides, there is a conveyer belt extending out of the bow 
for conveying sand or gravels from carriers to the wharf, making the visibility of 
navigators even worse.  Excessive blind area makes seafarers inconvenient to observe 
the small ships which are easy to enter into the blind area.  According to Regulations 




should not be longer than 1.5 times of overall length (Loa), or the carrier shall install a 
video monitoring device with the function of night vision on the bow to eliminate the 
blind area (CCS, 2015).  Most ships choose operational methods like ballast handling 
to meet the requirement.  However, shipowners and operators always violate 
operational requirements since some operation need a lot of time, leading to excessive 
blind area in unloaded voyage.  Even in fully loaded voyage, the cargo is higher than 
general bulk carrier because of V-shape cargo hold as seen in Figure 3.5.  Huge blind 
area exists if stowage is unreasonable.  If the density of bulk cargo is very small, some 
operators may violate the limitation of the cargo height, leading to excessive blind area 
as well as poor stability (Author, 2018). 
Inland self-unload carrier’s loading sand is operated in the river rather than wharf.  
Sand dredges transfer wetted sand with about 20% water to self-unload carriers directly.  
Normally an inland self-unload carrier is always overloaded when it just finishes the 
loading process, which is allowed tacitly for the high efficiency of the loading method, 
as long as the carrier does not sail before pumping out water, resulting in risk of 
overloaded navigation when moving away from the dredge to mooring place.  
Seafarers’ sailing before water’s being pumped out completely enough results in 
overloaded voyage.  Sometimes, an inland self-unload carrier may be overloaded 
even after the water is totally pumped out because seafarers cannot accurately estimate 
how much wetted sand shall be loaded.  What’s worse, stability of self-unload carrier 
is quite sensitive to the quantity of excess cargo because of the V-shape cargo hold.    
Normally, for the sake of reducing bending stress of the hull gird, cargo hold is loaded 
from stern to bow.  Some operators transfer too much sand to the stern of the cargo 
hold, contributing to excessive trim by stern which leads to water’s flooding into hull 
from the entrance of engine room on the stern.  Besides, some operators on the dredge 




Figure 3.6 shows the loading process of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD.  
Normally there are more or less 6 heaps of sand in the cargo hold.  The loading 
sequence is from NO.1 to NO.6, resulting in excessive trim by stern to the carrier in 
loading NO.1 to NO.4, which is risky for small carriers with limited stability margin. 
 
Figure 3.3 – A Typical inland self-unload carrier in the PRD  
Sources: Author 
 
Figure 3.4 – Pictorial view of blind area 
Sources: Author 
 
Figure 3.5 – Transverse section of inland self-unload carriers 





Figure 3.6 – Pictorial view of loading process 
Sources: Author 
3.3 Recently Introduced RCMs 
Both the administration and CCS introduced several risk control measures in recent 
years: 1) limitation to the length of stem extension of the conveyer belt; 2) limitation 
to the length of blind area; 3) installation of video monitoring device with the function 
of night vision if the blind area is beyond the stipulated length (introduced in 2015); 4) 
establish standard manual to guide the loading and erect rulers in the cargo hold to 
measure the height of cargo; 5) establish requirements on watching in fishing areas 
and wharf areas.   
Video monitoring device with night vision can totally eliminate the blind area, but it 
is voluntary.  Shipowners prefer to choose operational methods like ballasting instead 
of installing video device to save cost.  The operational procedures are not as practical 
as the installation of video monitoring device with the function of night vision since 
manning on inland self-unload carrier is limited and it is not easy to cope with so many 
small ships.  From the perspective of the administration, it is not easy to supervise 
seafarers’ implementation.   
The standard loading manual relies on the implementation of seafarers.  Worse still, 
potential excessive trim may be caused by the standard loading process. 
All in all, the recently introduced measures are relatively reasonable but too reliable 
on good safety awareness of seafarers.  Measures which facilitate seafarers’ fulfilling 




3.4 Acceptance Criteria of GCAF and NCAF 
Acceptable criteria varies in different countries.  Once IMO recommended 3 million 
($) as threshold value of GCAF and NCAF.  The value has become outdated and new 
criteria is still in discussion (Skjong, 2018).  Rolf Skjong recommended the following 
formula to calculate optimum acceptable NCAF (Skjong, 2002): NCAFA = ge(1-w)/4w.  
In the formula: g is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; e is expected lifetime of 
a person assessed at birth; w is the proportion of time we invest in economic activity.  
Considering vacation, education and retirement, w is around 1/7 for China.  As seen 
in Table 3.1, the optimum acceptable NCAFA for China in 2017 is 1,000,000 ($).   
Table 3.1 – Calculation of acceptable NCAF 
g ($) w e (year) NCAFA 
9300 1/7 75 1,000,000 




4. DATA ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL ACCIDENTS 
Considering that accidents reports from 2016 to 2017 is still not completely available, 
resulting in obstacles in collecting investigation reports, considering that voluntary 
installation of video device with night vision (RCO 1) was introduced in 2015 (CCS, 
2015), leading to difficulty of figuring out the number of carriers which voluntarily 
installed video device, this study uses data from 2006 to 2015 for analysis. 
4.1 Classification of Accidents 
Regulation on Investigation of Inland River Traffic Accidents divides accidents into 
six main categories: a) collision, contact or damage by waves; b) touching rocks or 
grounding; c) fire or explosion; d) sinking; e) damage of important components which 
affect seaworthiness obviously; f) others (China Transport Ministry, 2012).   
Inland self-carriers’ touching rocks is not common because riverbed of inland 
waterways in the PRD are covered by silt.  It is unnecessary to set Category b in this 
research.  The draft of most inland self-unload carriers is about 4 meters and heavy 
groundings also rarely happen.  As to category e, there is enough time for seafarers to 
take measures to prevent further risk as long as the rudder is still working.  The only 
reported case about failure of important component is the failure of rudder which 
resulted in a collision in the end and the case can be classified into collision.  Damage 
by waves never happened to inland ships of 300 GT and above in the past in the PRD. 
For the convenience of researching, the author classifies accidents into five specific 
types: collision, sinking, contact, fire, explosion, others.  Collision means collision 
between ships.  Contact means ships’ contacting objects which are not ships, 
including bridges, rocks, reverbed and other unidentified objects.  Fire and explosion 
are easy to understand as their names suggest.  Sinking means a self-unload carrier’s 




type above are classified into others.   98 accidents involving 101 inland self-unload 
carriers of and above 300 GT happened from 2006 to 2015. 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of accidents in each year.  There is neither obvious 
increasing nor decreasing tendency in these ten years.  More accidents happened 
when estate industry was booming like 2007, 2011 and 2015, for the sake of more 
voyages of inland self-unload carriers in a prosperous market of estate industry.  
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of accidents in each type.  From the perspective of 
number of accidents, collision is the main accident type.  Sinking which is mainly 
self-sinking for the sake of classing sinking accident caused by collision, contact, fire 
or explosion into the primordial accident, is the second most, followed by contact. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Distribution of accidents in each year 
Sources: Author. 
 














4.2 Definition of Human Errors 
Normally investigators define a major cause and several minor causes in a report.  
Most of these causes are human errors.  It is difficult to classify human errors since 
they are interrelated.  In this paper, omission means the navigator does not observe or 
observe potential risks too late to avoid the accident because of fatigue, distraction and 
excessive blind area.  Carelessness means the navigator has observed the potential 
hazard early enough but pays limited attention, like haste misjudgment, omission of 
signal and dangerous operations (deviating customary route, dangerous overtaking, 
overspeed, keeping small distance, ignoring VHF, etc.).  Poor skill means the 
navigator pays enough attention but still fails to operate correctly due to unfamiliarity 
with ship maneuverability and navigable environment.  For instance, a navigator 
berths carefully but still collides other ships or shoreside structures. 
4.3 Data Analysis Concerning Collision 
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of all 69 collisions in six time zone.  There are more 
collisions which happened from midnight to 8:00 in the next morning.  Fatigue and 
bad visibility at this period may be two factors.   
 





Table 4.1 shows the major causes of the 69 collisions.  Almost every accident involves 
human error.  However, for some collisions like self-unload carriers’ colliding small 
boats due to omission of watch, owing all responsibilities to seafarers is unfair.  
According to the communication with seafarers on self-unload carries, operational 
procedures are not as practical as the installation of video monitoring device to 
eliminate blind area since manning on inland self-unload carrier is limited and it is not 
easy to cope with so many widely distributed small boats.  China MSA has organized 
training courses about watching in fishing areas and wharf areas, the effectiveness is 
not good.  From the perspective of the administration, it is not easy to monitor 
seafarers’ obeying operational procedures (Author, 2018).   
Recognizing that most of collisions can be avoided if one side takes measures 
reasonably, so the faults of self-unload carriers in accidents mainly caused by the other 
ships are also helpful in hazard identification and analysis.  Considering that three 
collisions happened between inland self-unload carriers, actually there are 13 inland 
self-unload carriers encountered collisions mainly caused by the other ship.  In these 
13 cases, only one carrier was totally without fault.  The most common cause is 
carelessness. 
Table 4.1 – Major causes of collisions 
The other ship’s fault 10 
Ommision (did not observe or observed the other ship too late to avoid collision) 30 
Carelessness (observed the other ship early but paid no attention or dangerous operations) 22 
Poor skill (observed the other ship and paid enough attention but failed) 2 
Climate (Heavy fog) 2 
Uncertifacted navigator 2 
Failure of rudder 1 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.2 illustrates that 70% of collisions are self-unload carriers’ colliding other ships.  
58% of ships collided by self-unload carriers are small boats (less than 30 GT), as seen 
in Table 4.3.  Table 4.4 provides a horizontal comparison on the number of collisions 




account for 80% collisions with small boats while its proportion in ships in the PRD 
is far less than 80%, demonstrating self-unload carriers’ higher frequency of colliding 
small boats.  Larger blind area may be one of the causes.  Table 4.5 shows the GT of 
the 28 inland self-unload carriers which collided small boats.  22 of them are carriers 
of 1000 GT and above.  Considering that the number of inland self-unload carriers 
less than 1000 GT are almost the same with the number of carriers of and above 1000 
GT, inland self-unload carriers of 1000 GT and above have higher frequency in 
colliding small boats.  Normally, the larger the inland self-unload carrier is, the wider 
its blind area is, partly proving the influence of blind area.  Table 4.6 shows the 
conditions of loading for self-unload carriers which collided small ships.  Most of 
self-unload carriers which collided small boats are unloaded.  Normally, unloaded 
inland self-unload carriers own larger blind area, further proving the positive 
correlation between blind area and self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats. 
Table 4.2 – Forms of collisions 
Colliding Being collided Head-on Total 
48 16 5 69 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.3 – GT of ships collided by inland self-unload carriers 
less than 30 30 - 150 150 and above total 
28 2 18 48 
Sources: Author.  
Table 4.4 – Types of ships which collided small boats 
self-unload carrier oil tanker high-speed ship general carrier container 
28 1 1 1 1 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.5 – GT of inland self-unload carriers which collided small boats 
300 to 1000 GT Of 1000 GT and above total 
6 22 28 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.6 – Loading conditions of inland self-unload carriers 
Without load Full load Total 





Table 4.7 shows the materials of small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers.  
Over 90% of them are wooden boats which are more difficult to be detected by radar 
than steel ships (Lv, 2016). 
Table 4.7 – Materials of small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers 
wooden steel Total 
25 3 28 
Sources: Author. 
As seen in Table 4.8, most of small boats collided by self-unload carriers are fishing 
boats.  About one fourth of the 24 fishing boats are uncertificated, which means they 
are made by local villagers without certification, resulting in difficulty of raising safety 
level by improving regulations of small boats.  The solution to uncertificated small 
boats is strengthened supervision rather than improved regulations of them. 
Table 4.8 – Usage of small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers 
Fishing boat Traffic boat Cargo boat Ferry 
24 1 2 1 
Sources: Author. 
As seen in Table 4.9, there are less collisions with small ships from April to June 
because fishing in the Pearl River is forbidden in this period (Kong, 2017), confirming 
the important role of fishing boats in these small boats. 
Table 4.9 – Small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers in each month 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
3 3 3 0 1 0 2 2 7 3 0 4 
Sources: Author. 
As seen in Table 4.10, mostly, visibility was good when collisions between inland self-
unload carriers and small boats happened since navigation in heavy fog is forbidden.  
Fog did not play an essential role in self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats while 
device with additional function of passing through heavy fog is far more expensive 
than the common type.  So the function of passing through heavy fog is unnecessary. 
Table 4.10 – Visibility when inland self-unload carriers collided small boats 
Good Light fog Heavy fog total 





4.4 Data analysis concerning sinking  
There are 13 sinking casualties from 2006 to 2015.  All 13 sinking accidents are 
capsizing because bulk slip and free liquid surface make the unseaworthy carrier easy 
to capsize in the final stage of accidents.   
As seen in Table 4.11, none of sunken inland self-unload carriers is unloaded since 
unloaded self-unload carriers have enough freeboard to ensure stability margin.  
Sunken self-unload carriers are either loaded or in the process of loading and unloading.  
As seen in Table 4.12, most of sunken inland self-unload carriers are less than 1000 
GT because smaller carriers have less stability margin.  Their stability is easy to 
become unqualified for overload. 
Table 4.11 – Loading conditions of sunken inland self-unload carriers 
Loaded Loading Unloading Unloaded 
5 6 2 0 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.12 – GT of sunken inland self-unload carriers 
Less than 1000 GT Of and above 1000 GT 
9 3 
Sources: Author. 
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of sinking in six time zones.  More accidents 
happened from 20:00 to 8:00 in the next morning.  Seafarers’ fatigue results in 
omission and carelessness.  Poor vision in night is obstacle to communication 
between seafarers on carriers and operators on dredgers as well as detection of dangers. 
 





Figure 4.5 shows the major causes of the 13 sinking accidents.  Obviously, improper 
loading is the main cause.  Mainly, there are three kinds of improper loading: 
unbalanced transverse loading, unbalanced longitudinal loading and over-high loading.   
Unbalanced transverse loading contributes to heel, reducing freeboard and inlet angel.  
Unbalanced longitudinal loading results in unacceptable trim, reducing inlet angel.  
Over-high loading raises the gravity center of cargo, leading to poor stability as well 
as excessive blind area.  Overload is the second major cause.  Seafarers always let 
the inland self-unload carriers overload first, and then pump out water.  Seafarers may 
sail before water is pumped out completely enough or fail in estimation of the amount 
of wetted sand should be loaded.  They do not want to trouble themselves to unload 
excessive sand.  Also, shipowners may encourage seafarers to ignore small amount of 
overload which means additional money for them. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Major causes of sinking accidents 
Sources: Author. 
4.5 Data analysis concerning contact 
Table 4.13 shows the objects contacted by inland self-unload carriers in the PRD.  Six 
of objects contacted by inland self-unload carriers are bridges because of the high 




As seen in Table 4.14, carelessness is the most common major cause of contact.  
However, the severest contact which led to collapse of the bridge contacted, is caused 
by heavy fog. 
As seen in Table 4.15, all of the eight inland self-unload carriers which contacted 
bridge or other objects are of and above 1000GT since bigger carriers have both higher 
height and deeper draft.  
As seen in Table 4.16, inland self-unload carriers account for 37.5% of ships contacting 
bridges in the PRD.  The frequency of colliding bridges is higher than other ships but 
not so obvious as colliding small boats. 
Table 4.13 – Objects contacted by inland self-unload carriers 
Bridge Rock Wharf 
6 1 1 
Sources: Author 
Table 4.14 – Major causes of contacts 
Carelessness Poor navigation skill Climate (Heavy fog) 
5 2 1 
Sources: Author 
Table 4.15 – GT of inland self-unload carriers in contacts 
Less than 1000 GT Of and above 1000 GT 
0 8 
Sources: Author 
Table 4.16 – Ships which contacted bridges in the PRD by ship type  
Inland self-unload carrier General cargo ship Working ship 
6 7 3 
4.6 Data analysis concerning fire and explosion 
Fire and explosion is not common for inland self-unload carriers.  Two fire casualties 
were caused by welding.  One explosion was caused by short circuit and fuel of flash 
point less than 60 Celsius degree which has been forbidden to use on inland self-unload 





4.7 Summary of data from 2006 to 2015 
As seen in Table 4.17 and 4.18, more than half of fatalities are third parties.  Most of 
them are fishmen collided by inland self-unload carriers.  Table 4.19 shows the 
frequency and PLL of two scenarios which shall be further discussed in Chapter 5.  
Table 4.17 – Number of accidents and fatalities 
Initial 
event 
Number of accidents Number of fatalities 
total With fatality Without 
fatality 
Crew Third party 
To crew To 3rd party 
Collision 69 5 33 31 18 50 
Sinking 13 6 0 7 18 0 
Contact 8 0 1 7 0 8 
Fire 2 1 0 1 1 0 
Explosion 1 1 0 0 3 0 
others 5 4 0 1 4 0 
Total 98 17 34 47 44 58 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.18 – Frequency of accidents (Fleet = 12899 ship*years) 
 Frequency 
Initial event total With fatality Without fatality 
To crew To 3rd party 
Collision 5.35E-03 3.88E-04 2.56E-03 2.40E-03 
Sinking 1.01E-03 4.65E-04  5.43E-04 
Contact 6.20E-04  7.75E-05 5.43E-04 
Fire 1.55E-04 7.75E-05  7.75E-05 
Explosion 7.75E-05 7.75E-05   
others 3.88E-04 3.10E-04  7.75E-05 
Total 7.60E-03 1.32E-03 2.64E-03 3.64E-03 
Sources: Author. 
Table 4.19 – Two scenarios of inland self-unload carriers of and above 1000 GT 
Scenarios Number of 
accidents 
Fatalities Frequency PLL 
Collide small boats due to omission 16 19 2.46E-3 2.92E-3 
Collide small boats due to carelessness 5 6 7.68E-4 9.21E-4 





5. THE APPLICATION OF FSA TO RESEARCH OBJECT 
5.1 STEP 1 – Hazard Identification 
5.1.1  List of Identified Hazards 
The HAZID was first conducted by the author who is a nominated surveyor, and then 
supplemented and perfected by experts familiar with research object (i.e. shipowners, 
navigators, ship designers, surveyors and investigators from the PRD).  As seen in 
Table 5.1 to 5.3, 30 hazards were identified by checking operations in three working 
conditions: sailing; loading and unloading; berthing and mooring. 
Table 5.1 – Potential hazards under condition of sailing 
NO. Hazard 
1 Colliding small boats due to omission 
2 Collision with ships more than 30 GT due to omission 
3 Collision or contact due to intentional carelessness (like dangerous operations) 
4 Collision or contact due to unintentional carelessness (like haste misjudgment) 
5 Sinking due to over-high load 
6 Sinking due to overload 
7 Sinking due to rapid rotation with initial heel caused by improper load 
8 Collision or contact due to poor skill 
9 Collision or contact due to uncertificated navigator 
10 Collision or contact due to failure of important components such as rudder 
11 Sinking due to free liquid surface in the cargo hold 
12 Collision or contact due to climate (heavy fog) 
13 Sinking due to climate (rapids) 
14 Sinking due to hull failure 
Sources: Author. 
Table 5.2 – Potential hazards under condition of loading and unloading 
Sources: Author. 
NO. Hazard 
1 Capsizing caused by excessive heel due to unreasonable distribution of cargo 
2 Capsizing caused by excessive trim due to unreasonable distribution of cargo 
3 Capsizing caused by poor stability due to intentional overload 
4 Capsizing caused by free liquid surface due to failure of pump 
5 Capsizing caused by free liquid surface due to failure of alarm system and forgetting start-up 




Table 5.3 – Potential hazards under condition of berthing and mooring 
Sources: author. 
5.1.2  Top-ranked Hazards 
Table 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 define the frequency index, severity index and risk matrix.  The 
frequency index of a hazard is decided by the magnitude of its frequency.  Severity 
index is decided by effects on human and property loss.   
Table 5.4 – Definition of Frequency Index 
FI Severity Definition F 
7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10 
6  Likely to occur once per year on one ship 1 
5 Probable Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships 10-1 
4  Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 100 ships 10-2 
3 Remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1,000 ships 10-3 
2  Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10,000 ships 10-4 
1 Extremely remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 100,000 ships 10-5 
Sources: IMO, (2013). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO 
Rule-Making Process. London: Author. 
Table 5.5 – Definition of Severity Index 
SI Severity Effects on human Property loss ($) S 
1 Minor Minor injuries or very small property loss < E5 0.01 
2 Significant Single severe injurie or small property loss E5 – E6 0.1 
3 Severe Single fatality or multiple severe injuries or 
medium property loss. 
E6 – 2.0E6 1 
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities or huge property loss > 2.0E6 10 
Sources: author. 
NO. Hazard 
1 Contact or collision when berthing due to poor skill 
2 Contact or collision when berthing due to omission 
3 Personal injury due to wrong operation of machine 
4 Personal injury due to failure of structure (like conveyor arm, cable and anchor chain) 
5 Drowning as consequence of sinking in water due to omission of seafarers 
6 Fire or explosion caused by short circuit and accumulated gas 
7 Fire or explosion caused by welding and accumulated gas in repairing 
8 Being collided due to turning off anchor light in mooring 
9 Being collided due to mooring in customary route 




Table 5.6 – Definition of Risk matrix 
Risk Index (RI) 
FI Frequency 
SEVERITY 
1 2 3 4 
Minor significant severe catastrophic 
7 Frequent 8 9 10 11 
6  7 8 9 10 
5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9 
4  5 6 7 8 
3 remote 4 5 6 7 
2  3 4 5 6 
1 Extremely remote 2 3 4 5 
Sources: IMO, (2013). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO 
Rule-Making Process. London: Author. 
Table 5.7 shows the two top-ranked hazards with respect to human life.  Big inland 
self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats results in third-party fatalities while small 
carriers’ sinking leads to fatalities of crew.   
Table 5.8 shows the two top-ranked hazards with respect to property loss.  Big inland 
self-unload carriers’ contacting bridges normally results in considerable property loss 
for high cost of repairing bridges. 
Table 5.7 – Top-ranked hazards with respect to human life 
Main Hazards FI SI RI 
Fatalities as consequence of colliding small boats by big carriers (of and above 1000 
GT) with blind area due to omission 
3 3 6 
Fatalities as consequence of sinking due to overload or improper loading of small 
carriers (less than 1000 GT). 
3 3 6 
Sources: author 
Table 5.8 – Top-ranked hazards with respect to property loss 
Main Hazards FI SI RI 
Medium property loss as consequence of collision due to omission or carelessness 3 3 6 





5.2 STEP 2 – Risk Analysis 
5.2.1  ETA and FTA on Accidents 
Figure 5.1 shows the ETA on collision.  The event sequence of colliding small boats, 
colliding bigger ships and being collided are different.  Normally, colliding small 
boats brings about limited damage to inland self-unload carriers but catastrophic 
damage small boats.  In contrast, collisions with large ships, especially with huge sea-
going vessels, result in high risk of fatalities on inland self-unload carriers.  After 
collision, seafarers have more chance to survive if inland self-unload carriers sink 
slowly.   
Figure 5.2 shows the FTA on collision.  Human factors account for considerable 
proportion of major causes.  The most common major cause varies from scenarios.  
Omission is more common in colliding small boats while carelessness is more common 
in collision with ships more than 30 GT. 
Figure 5.3 shows the FTA on sinking accidents.  About 80% of sinking accidents 
resulted from poor stability.  Improper load and overload are causes of poor stability.  
Overload and improper load are easy to observe but seafarers just ignore the hazards 
for various factors such as poor safety awareness.  The key to controlling overload 
and improper load is effective supervision.   
The event sequence of sinking is quite simple.  Most of inland self-unload carriers 
capsized suddenly and rapidly without time for escaping.  So ETA on sinking 
accident is omitted here. 
Figure 5.4 shows the ETA on contact.  The most severe scenario is that a self-unload 
carrier contacts a bridge with people on it and makes the bridge collapse.  For 
contacts with underwater objects, inland self-unload carriers capsize rapidly when 
excessive heel or trim appears, or seafarers normally have enough time to deal with 





Figure 5.1 – ETA on collision 
Sources: author. 
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Figure 5.3 – FTA on sinking accident 
Sources: author. 
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5.2.2  Risk Assessment 
5.2.2.1 Individual risk assessment 
Intuitively, individual risk of third parties or passengers is not in the scope of this study.  
Only the individual risk of crew on inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is researched.  
Assuming a crew size of 8 on a typical inland self-unload carrier according to the 
average gross tonnage of the fleet and manning principals, the individual risk of crew 
is estimated to be 4.3E-04 per ship year.  Table 5.9 shows the individual risk criteria 
recommended by the IMO (IMO, 2000).  Besides, Li recommended 1.4E-4 as the 
datum value of individual risk of staff in transportation industry in China (Li, 2010).  
If we adjust one order of magnitude to make the ALARP area, it is 1.4E-5 to 1.4E-3.  
According to the individual risk acceptance criteria, the individual risk of crew on 
inland self-unload carriers falls within the ALARP area.  
Table 5.9 – Individual risk criteria 
 Lower limit of ALARP Upper limit of ALARP 
Crew 10-6 10-3 
Passenger 10-6 10-4 
Third parties, public ashore 10-6 10-4 
For new ship 10-6 Reduce an order of magnitude 
Sources: IMO. (2000). Decision parameters including risk acceptance criteria: submitted by Norway 
(MSC 72/16/X). London: Author.   
5.2.2.2 Social risk assessment 
The societal risk to crew is expressed through FN-diagram presented in Figure 5.5 
established by the method recommended by the IMO.  Societal risk of crew on inland 
self-unload carriers in the PRD falls within the ALARP area.  IMO gave several FN-
diagrams for ocean-going ships including bulk carriers based on data from LMIS from 
1978 to 1998.  Compared with the FN-diagram of ocean-going bulk carriers in Figure 
5.6, inland self-unload carriers’ frequency of multiple fatalities is lower because of 





Figure 5.5 – FN-diagram for risk of research object to crew (2006-2015) 
Sources: author 
 
Figure 5.6 – FN-diagram for risk of ocean-going ships to crew (1978-1998) 
Sources: IMO. (2000). Decision parameters including risk acceptance criteria: submitted by Norway 
(MSC 72/16/X). London: Author. 
Though inland self-unload carriers caused considerable fatalities to third parties like 
fishmen, it is difficult to establish acceptable criteria because it is not easy to determine 
the Economic Value (EV) for involving two parties in one accident.  This study 
established a FN-diagram for inland self-unload carriers’ risk to third parties by 
halving the third-party fatalities as well as using the same EV of inland self-unload 
carriers in the PRD.  As seen in Figure 5.7, the risk is also in the ALARP area. 
Table 5.10 supplements the process of calculating PLLA and FN-diagram.  For an 
inland self-unload carrier in the PRD, an average PLLA is based on the EV of the 


























in each year from 2006 to 2015.  By consulting shipowners, based on the average 
gross tonnage of the fleet, the average annual EV (which is equal to the annual turnover) 
for each carrier is estimated to be approximately $400,000.   
For decreasing trend of occupational fatalities and increasing trend of GNP in the last 
decade, PLLA calculated by data of 2017 is more reasonable. 
 
Figure 5.7 – FN-diagram for risk of research object to third parties (2006-2015) 
Sources: author 
Table 5.10 – Data about calculation of PLLA 
Year Occupational fatalities GNP ($) trillion 
2006 112822 3.4 
2007 101480 4.1 
2008 91172 4.9 
2009 83196 5.3 
2010 79552 6.2 
2011 75572 7.4 
2012 71983 8.1 
2013 69434 8.8 
2014 68061 9.8 
2015 66182 10.5 
2016 43062 11.2 
2017 37852 12.4 
EV of one ship ($) 400,000 
PLLA = number of fatalities ⋅ EV / GNP = 1.22E-3 (data of 2017) 
F1 = PLLA/(1+1/2+1/3+1/4+1/5+1/6+1/7+1/8) = 4.5E-4 

























5.3 STEP 3 – Identification of Risk Control Options 
Table 5.11 – Risk Control Options 
RCO 1 Video monitoring device with night vision for carriers of and above1000 GT 
RCO 2 TCPA and DCPA alarm of Radar with training for carriers of and above1000 GT 
RCO 3 Improved design of loading and unloading procedure 
RCO 4 Electrical overload and over-high load supervising system 
RCO 5 Improved safety education of seafarers 
RCO 6 Set standard for noise of navigation room and rest rooms (< 65 DB) 
RCO 7 W-Shape cargo hold 
Sources: Author. 
Table 5.11 presents 7 alterative RCOs put forward by experts and the author. 
RCO 1 can eliminate the excessive blind area to facilitate the watch of seafarers, 
reducing possibility of colliding small boats due to omission.  Its effectiveness varies 
from visual range of video device.  Normally, speed of inland self-load carrier ranges 
from 13 to 17 kilometer per hour.  Most navigators consulted said they need at least 
300 meters distance to ensure success rate of avoiding colliding small boats at that 
speed.  Risk reduction of video device with visual range of 300 meters shall be 
discussed in Step 4. 
RCO 2 mainly reduces hazards detected by radar but omitted.  Alarm based on TCPA 
and DCPA can remind navigators of the potential hazards at an early stage.  Besides, 
considerable navigators said they need training on radar, especially for imported radar 
with instruction of foreign languish.  MSA can organize onboard training once a year.  
However, the cost benefit assessment is complex because some carriers have already 
installed radar with alarm voluntarily, resulting in huge work of calculating the number 
of carriers with or without alarm. 
RCO 3 aims to reduce capsizing caused by improper loading.  The administration 
shall establish criteria for stability in the process of loading.  It can be lower than the 
normal criteria with certain limitations of operations like maximum steering angle, 
distance between anchorage and dredger, etc.  Nonetheless, overload in the process 




fee, is cheap.  The main cost is reduced shipment or reduced loading efficiency.  Its 
effectiveness depends on the implementation.   
RCO 4 is a good concept about preventing intentional overload and over-high load, 
but there is no mature product.  Besides, wave and flow distribution are challenges 
for the accurate detection of freeboard.  Both the cost and benefit are hard to estimate. 
RCO 5 pays attention to the widely existed human errors in accidents.  MSA can 
organize brief onboard training once a year by sending brochures about lessons learned 
from accidents.  Its cost is limited since the training is conducted onboard.  However, 
uncertainty of human errors makes the risk reduction extremely difficult. 
RCO 6 aims to create a better rest environment for seafarers to mitigate fatigue.  
Strengthened structure and improved hull lines are the main cost while risk reduction 
is hard to determine. 
RCO 7 lowers the barycenter of cargo to improve stability, but W-shape cargo hold 
needs two conveyors belts, further weakening visual range, leading to difficulty in 
estimating risk reduction.   
5.4 STEP 4 – Cost-effectiveness Analysis 
RCO 1 is analyzed in this step because its cost and benefit are relatively easier to assess 
than other RCOs.  Cost benefit assessments of other RCOs need further study. 
5.4.1  Cost estimation 
Initial cost is based on information from suppliers.  Lifetime of inland self-unload 
carriers is 33 years according to Regulation on Old Ship Management (China Transport 
Ministry, 2002).  Table 5.12 presents the marginal cost of RCO 1 for new ship. 







Total marginal cost 
($ / ship*year) 





5.4.2  Risk reduction of RCO 1 
Risk reduction is based on considerations of scenarios affected.  Experts opinions on 
risk reduction of big carriers’ colliding small boats due to omission range from 20% to 
70% and concentrate in the range of 40% to 70%, as seen in Table 5.13.   
Some experts think RCO 1 can also reduce big carriers’ colliding small boats due to 
carelessness.  In some historical accidents, navigators observed small boats early but 
missed them after small boats’ entering into blind area.  In contrast, some experts 
deem carelessness means poor safety awareness.  An incautious navigator would not 
use the device even if he had observed small boats.  The consensus degree is low.  
This study ignores the risk reduction from this scenario to get a higher NCAF. 
Table 5.13 – Risk reduction of big carriers’ colliding small boats due to omission 
< 10% 10%-20% 20%-30% 30%-40% 40%-50% 50%-60% 60%-70% > 70% 
0 0 2 2 6 6 6 0 
Sources: Questionnaires from experts (single choice question). 


















2.92E-03 114 20% 5.84E-04 265 22.8  414,726  
2.92E-03 114 30% 8.76E-04 265 34.2  263,470  
2.92E-03 114 40% 1.17E-03 265 45.6  187,842  
2.92E-03 114 50% 1.46E-03 265 57.0  142,466  
2.92E-03 114 60% 1.75E-03 265 68.4  112,215  
2.92E-03 114 70% 2.04E-03 265 79.8  90,607  
Sources: Author 
5.5 STEP 5 – Recommendations 
An RCO is regarded to be cost-effective if the NCAF is less than USD 1 million, which 
has been explained in Chapter 3.  Obviously, RCO 1 is cost-effective, as seen in Table 
5.14.  The actual NCAF of RCO 1 should be even lower.  This study recommends 




6. SUMMARY, PROSPECT AND LIMITATION 
The application of FSA methodology to inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is 
conducted according to the data from 2006 to 2015, filling the gap of overall risk 
assessment of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD.  The overall risk of research 
object is located in the ALARP area, which means a RCO shall be implemented to 
reduce the risk when it is cost-effective.   
Colliding small boats is a top-ranked hazard for inland self-unload carriers of and 
above 1000 GT.  RCO 1 is a cost-effective solution to this hazard.  This study 
advises the administration to make the installation of video monitoring device with 
night vision from voluntary to mandatory.  
Capsizing due to improper load or overload is a top-ranked hazard for inland self-
unload carriers less than 1000 GT.  RCO 3 and RCO 4 are likely to be solutions.  
The cost is so high if RCO 4 just applies to self-unload carriers in the PRD that it need 
more inland self-unload carriers to split the soft developing fee.  Further research on 
the application of FSA to inland self-unload carriers in the whole country is 
recommended. 
Historical accidents show that almost every casualty is caused by human errors more 
or less.  RCO 5 and RCO 6 are designed to reduce human errors.   
With the tendency of large-size ship, RCO 7 may be a solution to over-high load for 
inland self-unload carriers wide enough. 
This study is not a standard report for omission of most RCOs’ CEA.  IACS and 
ICFTU indicated that considerable applications of FSA need 1 year and some 
applications even need 2 or 3 years (Papanikolaou, 2009, P. 126).  It is impossible to 




The absence of maritime database in China results in obstacle of applying FSA in the 
whole country.  Fortunately, the national maritime database is in construction.  
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